
TOP SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION

9 DECEMBER 1965 DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 289-65

COPY NO.



LIBRARY COPY

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

THIS



P0024316

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 6800.10 DOES NOT APPLY

517109

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY IS PRODUCED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR APPROPRIATE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. IT IS FURNISHED TO NON-DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AGENCIES FOR INFORMATION ONLY, INTERPRETATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION REPRESENT PRELIMINARY VIEWS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION IN THE LIGHT OF FURTHER INFORMATION AND MORE COMPLETE ANALYSIS,

CERTAIN ITEMS MAY BE DESIGNATED SPECIFICALLY FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. OTHER ITEMS MAY BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER, BUT ONLY ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

WARNING

| (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) | | |
|------------------------|--|--|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

9 December 1965

Blocked portions are non responsive

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Summary 289-65

INDEX AND PRECIS


| ZAMBIA: | р | • | 1 |
|------------------------|------|----|---|
| CYPRUS: | р | • | 2 |
| JORDAN: | р | • | 3 |
| USSR: | р | • | 4 |
| DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: | р | | 4 |
| FINLAND: | р | • | 5 |
| NOTES: | р | | 6 |
| GUATEMALA: | | | |
| CHILE: | | | |
| JAMAICA: | | | |
| VENEZUELA: | | | |
| REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: | p. : | F– | 1 |
| | р. : | F- | 6 |
| NORTH VIETNAM: | р. : | F- | 7 |

1

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

CAMBODIA: p. F-8LAOS: p. F-11 COMMUNIST p. F-14CHINA: The army continues to defy Sukarno. INDONESIA: p. F-15 The PKI could be receiving clandesp. F-16 tine arms shipments in remote islands.

> Next pg. is non responsive; Pgs.1 - F-14 are non responsive



Zambian Views on Rhodesia


Zambian President Kaunda reportedly has renewed his plea to Britain for a military force to surround the Kariba dam. Kaunda also issued a statement yesterday warning other African leaders of the difficult position Zambia would be in if it broke diplomatic relations with Britain on 15 December as had been threatened by the OAU Foreign Ministers last week.

The Director of Military Operations of the British War Department indicated on his return from Zambia that a stalemate had developed between Lusaka and London over the UK's offer to send ground forces to Zambia.


The Director was unable to convince the Zambians that occupying the Rhodesian side of the Kariba power complex would not achieve the ends they desired. He stressed that any such move would arouse active resistance and cause the power control facilities to be destroyed. Moreover, he believes that President Kaunda has no appreciation of the difficulties involved and is unlikely to alter his demand for British military action against Rhodesia.

Zambian Minister of Local Government Sikota Wina claims that President Kaunda is under growing leftist (presumably radical) pressure "to force the pace of action on the Rhodesian crisis." Some cabinet members feel it might be acceptable to take steps that would destroy Zambia in the process if they also led to the Rhodesian government's downfall. Zambian Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe on his return from the recent OAU meeting in Addis Ababa also mentioned the possibility of his government precipitating a destructive war with Rhodesia.

Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith yesterday announced measures to be taken by Rhodesia to counter sanctions imposed by Britain. These measures include a regulation prohibiting Zambia and Malawi from paying for Rhodesian goods in British pounds and deportation of alien workers to open jobs for Rhodesians. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



FAMAGUSTA (OLD TOWN)




SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

Famagusta Dispute Settled


Details are now available on the UN "disengagement" agreement which has settled the Famagusta dispute.

Its principal elements are: (1) Removal of fortified positions except for Greek Cypriot posts in the harbor area; (2) no armed persons to be allowed in the region except policemen and normal military traffic; (3) five Greek Cypriot positions to be left unmanned; (4) a Turkish Cypriot school, apartment building, and shrine to be returned to civilian use; (5) a Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from positions on the walls; and (6) the removal of roadblocks and the ending of indiscriminate searches of civilians. By separate letter, the UN limits military patrolling in areas previously under dispute to its forces.

The Greek Cypriots are somewhat concerned lest Gen Grivas spur criticism of the accord when he returns to the island. President Makarios has, however, two letters from the Greek Government approving it and will use them if Grivas does voice public objections. Makarios has also indicated that if public opinion is not aroused, similar arrangements might be extended to other parts of the island. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



MAX SPEED MAX ALTITUDE ARMAMENT MACH 2.0 60,000 FEET 2-30_{MM} CANNON 2-FIRESTREAK AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES 2-48 X 2 INCH AIR-TO-AIR ROCKETS (UNGUIDED)



MAX SPEED M

MAX ALTITUDE ARMAMENT MIRAGE III E

MACH 2.5

60,000 FEET (APPROX)

2-30_{MM} CANNON

2-SIDEWINDER AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES

2-1,000 POUND BOMBS

(OR 18 ROCKETS)

DIA-ISIC 9 DEC 65

UNCLASSIFIED

British Eager To Sell Jordan Supersonic Aircraft

The British are now actively promoting the sale of LIGHTNING jet fighter aircraft to Jordan. A combat model and a trainer version put on a special demonstration on 7 December, and King Hussein flew the latter.

Army Chief-of-Staff Gen Khammash told US officials that the exhibition was designed to convince the King, who still feels indebted to de Gaulle for the offer of MIRAGES, that LIGHTNINGS have superior performance capabilities. Khammash implied that he was not worried over the United Arab Command deadline for acquiring supersonic aircraft as long as negotiations with Western powers were still under way. He did insist, however, that he could not go back to the UAC and request more funds but would have to work within the agreement secured at Casablanca — a reduction of the UAC's requirement for Jordan from 60 to 32 combat aircraft (plus four trainers) with the same financing as for the former number. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Soviet Weather Satellite Program

Vehicles in the COSMOS series have carried instruments capable of collecting weather information and the Soviets recently announced that COSMOS 92 was equipped for studies of infrared and ultraviolet radiation in the earth's atmosphere. No photographic-video system of a type required by a weather satellite has been detected, but the photographic relay system tested on early COSMOS satellites could probably be adapted and used in a nonrecoverable payload.

The long delay in orbiting a meteorological satellite in line with a 1962 agreement to exchange weather data with the US has apparently not been caused by technical difficulties; more likely it derives from such systems as the satellite-reconnaissance and deep-space exploration programs being given higher priority. Soviet comments on COSMOS 92, however, suggest that the USSR may orbit such a satellite soon. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Dominican Developments

Dominican Provisional President Garcia Godoy's failure to start the reintegration of rebel personnel into the armed forces could hurt his recently improved relations with the military. The President approved such a plan over a week ago but has yet to direct its implementation, even though the service chiefs are ready to act on it immediately. The delay may have resulted from pressure by ex-rebel chief Caamano.

A new challenge to the government has been issued by the labor unions that have called a strike at the Haina Sugar Mill -- southwest of Santo Domingo -- over the size of the Christmas bonus. The workers want more than the amount offered by the President. If he backs down, strikes and agitation will probably develop in other "autonomous" institutions and among government employees. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Finland Denies Its Proposed Treaty Inspired by Moscow

Finland's Foreign Minister Karjalainen denied in Stockholm recently that Moscow had inspired President Kekkonen's proposal for a neutrality treaty with Norway. He claimed that the pact "had been planned for a long time" and that his recent visits to Moscow and Stockholm had no connection with it. Sweden is inclined to believe that Kekkonen primarily wanted to start discussions on the subject and offered the suggestion with Finland's security in mind.

When pressed for specifics of the projected agreement, Karjalainen insisted that nothing definite had been developed — the basic idea was to establish a buffer between the NATO and Warsaw Pact zones.

The Swedish Ambassador in Oslo reports that Norwegians now tend to accept assurances that the Soviets were not behind the proposal, but they are still unable to find any advantages in it. Norway's Foreign Minister Lyng sees no need to answer the Finns now and is preoccupied by the domestic political implications of any position he might take. In general, the Scandinavian countries received Kekkonen's surprise move without any particular excitement.

The US Embassy in Helsinki believes that Kekkonen hoped to enhance his position with the Soviets and the Finnish electorate. The Norwegian Ambassador in Helsinki comments that the USSR has not publicly applauded his proposal. Most Finnish political party members and newspapers favored Kekkonen's offer. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



NOTES



GUATEMALA: Former Armed Forces Chief Col Ponciano hopes to launch a coup as soon as possible, apparently while the economy is on the decline and a climate of insecurity prevails because of recent terrorist activities. He feels that any delay will permit Chief-of-Government Peralta, who is aware of the plotting, to replace Ponciano backers in key positions with officers loyal to himself. Ponciano probably does not have enough military support to overthrow Peralta now, but it would increase if Peralta were unable to stop the wave of terrorism, improve economic conditions, and gain public confidence. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

CHILE: The US Defense Attache has verified that 142 paratroops have been moved to back up 600 national policemen in the territory in dispute with Argentina. A mixed boundary commission will begin meetings in the area on 9 January in an effort to reach a solution. The attache believes the paratroops were sent to strengthen Santiago's negotiating position and that the border problem will ultimately be solved through diplomatic channels, barring some provocative incident. (SECRET)

JAMAICA: The ambassador to the UN recently reported to Kingston that "Soviet Bloc countries" had offered aid and that he had indicated that the government's attitude would be "receptive." The chief of security service has strongly condemned the offer and pointed out that an influx of Communist technicians into Jamaica would probably ensue. The Minister of Communications and Works also was recently approached by an intermediary who offered to be helpful in obtaining Soviet aid and technicians. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

NOTES


VENEZUELA: An apparent attempt to detonate a bomb in the Venezuelan Congress on 6 December may signal a resumption of terrorist activity by the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). The PCV had shifted its emphasis to a political offensive because of the present incapacity of the Armed Forces of Liberation; however, recent reports have indicated the PCV's intention to continue the practice of political assassinations. The most recent exploit involved a bomb implanted in a gift sent to a congressman in the Democratic Action bloc who is a former member of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. If it had exploded in the congress building, as was probably intended, many persons could have been killed. The recipient, however, decided to take the "gift" home to his wife who became the sole casualty. Venezuelan authorities have tentatively identified the man who delivered the bomb as a member of the PCV. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

FAR EAST/ASIA SECTION

DIA Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET TRINE

GENERAL OPERATING AREAS VIET CONG/PAVN REGIMENTS



Developments in South Vietnam

Military

The only major ground activity in South Vietnam yesterday was in Quang Tin Province where over 40 per cent of a ranger battalion (ARVN) is reported to have been lost after being engaged by the Viet Cong northwest of Tam Ky.

The ARVN's 11th Ranger Battalion and the 1st Battalion of its 5th Regiment were on a search-and-destroy operation when front and rear elements of the ranger unit were brought under heavy fire. The rangers have reported only 200 of their original 350-man complement remain but have been unable to break down the number of killed, wounded, or missing.

At last report, the intensity of the engagement was increasing. The 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment (ARVN) has become surrounded and the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment (ARVN), sent in to reinforce the rangers, is also reported to be heavily engaged with the Viet Cong. Two battalions of US Marines have been alerted for movement into the area to support the ARVN forces. B-57s and helicopters have been supporting the ARVN forces. The fighting is said to have taken place at such close quarters that air support was difficult to provide. The coordinated ARVN/USMC operation has been named LIEN KET 18/HARVEST MOON respectively. Friendly casualties have been confirmed at four KIA (one US) and 41 WIA. No Viet Cong casualties have been reported.

The action in Quang Tin Province may be a forerunner of an intensified Communist campaign there and in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have reportedly been moving about and building up in this region, and the lack of attacks in 1st Corps last week had suggested that the enemy was repositioning his forces, assimilating newly infiltrated units, and planning for new operations.

The Communists are thought to have the capability to launch attacks in northern Binh Dinh Province, and the reported presence of coffins near Haoi Nhon suggests that they are planning major operations, during which they expect to sustain high casualties. An agent claims that the Viet Cong forced laborers there to make coffins, and an air observer saw what appeared to be 200 of them on 1 December.

During further interrogation, the Political officer of the signal company of the Song Lam (or 33d) Regiment (PAVN) alleged that the Communists' winter-spring campaign would take place in the 10 northern provinces of South Vietnam. It was supposedly to be conducted by a corps consisting of three field fronts, or divisions. The field front to which his regiment was subordinate was responsible for Kontum, Pleiku, and parts of Binh Dinh and Phu Bon Provinces and comprised the following 32d Regiment (PAVN); Song Lam Regiment (PAVN); H-15 Battalion (Viet Cong Main Force); a heavy mortar battalion; and an antiaircraft (14.5-mm machine gun) battalion. COMUSMACV comments that the only evidence to support the story about a corps or field fronts is the presence of Viet Cong and PAVN forces in the area which could approximately equal the size of the three divisions mentioned.

The defector also stated that a unit in southwestern Pleiku Province had monitored US and ARVN communications during the Plei Me battle. The team, which had been operational in South Vietnam for a long time, consisted of 10 personnel operating under the direct control of Viet Cong Military Region 5. The information gathered was analyzed by Military Region 5 and then passed to Communist forces in the field. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Political

The Viet Cong offer of a 12-hour Christmas cease fire "so that Catholic soldiers in the armed forces of the Saigon puppet government, the US, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and so forth may attend Mass" is probably genuine, although obviously made for its propaganda value. Similar cease fires have occurred in past years during TET, the Vietnamese lunar New Year, as demonstrations by the Viet Cong of their control over the course of the war.

Moscow's Pravda has printed an article by its Hanoi correspondent which describes the recent battle at Plei Me as a Viet Cong victory and as significant because for the first time in the war "patriotic armed forces on their own initiative underwent extended positional warfare." A spokesman for the Viet Cong Saigon Regional Headquarters was quoted as saying his forces still held the initiative and were carrying on fierce fights with the "interventionists."

The Soviet Union on 8 December denounced alleged US aggression in Vietnam and said the Americans were planning further escalation of the war. TASS publicized a draft message forwarded to Britain, as cochairman with Russia of the 1954 Geneva Conference, which demanded that the US strictly observe the 1954 Geneva agreements and "end the bandit war against the Vietnamese people." Probably timed to coincide with the release of the charge, flag carrying demonstrators were seen in several areas in Moscow, and police reinforcements were sent to the US Embassy as rumors spread of a new "Hands Off Vietnam" demonstration forming up on the outskirts of Moscow.

During Senator Mansfield's visit, two Vietnamese Catholic leaders issued a "memorandum of position," which expressed gratitude for US aid but said "nevertheless, Catholics believe that this war is first and


principally a Vietnamese matter and if a solution for peace exists it is the Vietnamese who must find it." The memorandum noted that the Vietnamese people wanted a "normalization of political life" and called for creation of new, popularly based, political parties; formation and training of new political cadres; political education of the "popular mass"; and "creation of a stable and efficient government." The message called on the US to take into account popular sentiments that have always dominated political life in South Vietnam, particularly regionalism, justice, and religion and said the "Catholic community regrets that the political powers presently installed in Saigon do not yet satisfy these sentiments."

Buddhist political leader Thich Tri Quang has reportedly drafted an appeal for peace, to be delivered at the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) Congress later this month. In the name of Thich Tinh Kiet, Supreme Bonze of the UBA, the message says that the Buddhists fervently appeal to those fighting in Vietnam to seek ways to negotiate in order to stop the killing and destruction. The manifesto also asserts that whoever "purposely uses peace slogans" to continue the war will be "judged guilty by the people and history" and expresses gratitude for the "peace movements organized by the peoples of the US, Japan, and Ceylon, and by the Pope, and the UN Secretary General."


The draft appeal evidently represents Tri Quang's response to previously reported pressures for a Buddhist position on peace and the conduct of the war. If it is presented as worded, it will propose an anti-US and anti-Saigon policy on behalf of the Buddhists stronger than that in the Catholic memorandum.

A South Vietnamese government official reported that Nguyen Van Luc, a former high national council member, wants his embryo political party -- the National Construction Force (NCF) -- to publish a


weekly newspaper to take the place of the banned Hue student publication Sinh Vien Hue. The NCF paper reportedly will oppose Prime Minister Ky and his government. It has been agreed between Luc and his supporters that since the paper will be antigovernment, it should not be revealed as a product of the NCF. Earlier reports however, stated that the Sinh Vien Hue would be published clandestinely, with the tacit approval of 1st Corps Commander Gen Thi, even though Thi had the publication stopped as Ky ordered on 18 November. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)




1. K-50, 7.62mm SUBMACHINE GUN K-50 MODIFIED



2. SKS. 7.62mm CARBINE



3. AK-47. 7.62mm ASSAULT RIFLE



4. RPD. 7.62mm LIGHT MACHINE GUN RPD
1. CHICOM COPY AND MODIFICATION OF SOVIET PPSH-41
2,3,4 - SOVIET SECRET
9 DEC 65 DIA-ISIC NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Viet Cong/PAVN Units Increasing Use of New Family Assault Weapons

Combat experience reveals that Viet Cong/PAVN troops have come to rely more extensively on a heavy volume of close-in fire in conducting their offensive and defensive operations. The expanding use of the Communists' new family of light-weight, fully-automatic, assault-type weapons has significantly increased enemy capabilities in tactical engagements, particularly against friendly units equipped with M-1 rifles or M-14 semiautomatic rifles. A classic example of the success achieved by applying massive automatic weapons fire at close range during a short engagement was the recent attack on the 7th Regiment (ARVN) which resulted in over 700 friendly casualties. Salient characteristics and photographs of four members of the new family weapons are shown on the opposite page.


These automatic weapons have been standard in the Chinese Communist Army for several years and are also present in North Vietnam and North Korea. Weapons of this type were first captured in the southern delta region in early December 1964 and were later discovered in all Corps Tactical Zones. In February 1965, a Viet Cong prisoner stated that his company, a main force unit of the 58th VC Regiment, was equipped with these weapons in January 1965. The captive did not know where the weapons originated but had heard that they had been brought in by sea.

The extent of the Communist program to equip the Viet Cong with the 7.62-mm family of weapons is not known. It is reasonable to assume, however, that consistent with the availability of such weapons to Hanoi, first priority would be given to infiltrating PAVN units as they would be able to carry the weapons with them; second priority would probably be given to Viet Cong main force units.

The introduction of these weapons into the Viet Cong inventory is significant from the standpoint of an increased firepower capability and also as a demonstration of Communist confidence in their resupply system, since neither these weapons nor their ammunition can be obtained in South Vietnam. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page F-6



Air Strikes Against North Vietnam, 8-9 December

United States Air Force and Navy aircraft struck three fixed targets and conducted armed reconnaissance along North Vietnamese lines of communication during the period 8-9 December 1965.


On 8 December, two USN aircraft struck the Vinh Son radar site and one USN aircraft struck the Cap Mui Ron radar site. Pilots reported that low ceilings prevented damage assessment. Two USN aircraft on armed reconnaissance on 8 December struck Tiger Island radar site, but again, low clouds precluded a bomb damage assessment.

On 8 December, 22 USN armed reconnaissance aircraft reportedly destroyed one bridge and cratered two bridge approaches, and one road. Adverse weather caused the cancellation of 19 scheduled USN armed reconnaissance flights.

On 8 December, 117 USAF aircraft conducted armed reconnaissance and reportedly destroyed one ford, six barges, seven barracks, five bridges, and five buildings. They also damaged one bridge, one AAA site, three buildings and one barge. In addition, three bridge approaches and 13 road segments were cratered and 13 roads cut. Nine roads were seeded.

Initial reports for 9 December indicate that four USN aircraft conducted armed reconnaissance and damaged two barracks and cratered and seeded one road.

Search and rescue operations for the overdue Marine F-4B have been terminated with the pilot still listed as missing. No reports of aircraft losses have been received as of 0500 EST on 9 December. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



Indications of Cambodian Aid to the Viet Cong

Intelligence information continues to be received which indicates Cambodian support of the Viet Cong. Selected recent items from various sources are given in the following paragraph.

A reliable source of the US Army Attache in Tokyo states that the Chinese Communists and the Soviets unload supplies destined for South Vietnam at the port of Sihanoukville. These supplies are categorized as light equipment from the Chinese Communists and heavy equipment from the Soviets, which are transported in large trucks to the South Vietnamese border by the Cambodians. Bumper-to-bumper heavy truck traffic between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh is reportedly causing the road to break up in several places. The source also claimed that trucks operating on roads leading to South Vietnam were new and of unknown manufacture.

The French Ambassador in Phnom Penh is said to have informed the French Consulate in Saigon that the Cambodian Armed Forces (FARK) General Staff had agreed to a request from the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam for permission to establish a medical installation in Cambodia opposite Duc Co in Pleiku Province. In addition the FARK allegedly agreed to provide helicopters to transport seriously wounded Viet Cong to Phnom Penh.

A delayed report revealed that a US pilot on 31 October sighted a Japanese commercial ship en route down the Mekong River from Phnom Penh, near My Tho in Dinh Tuong Province, engaged in unloading boxes onto two sampans. When the aircraft circled the vessel, the sampans headed for shore and the ship weighed anchor and headed toward the sea. The South Vietnamese customs official who was on board the ship denied that anything unusual had occurred, including the stop, when queried regarding the incident; but customs officials could have been bribed by commercial ship personnel to overlook unusual activity. The above incident may not have been part of a Viet Cong supply operation, and the boxes being unloaded from the ship may not have originated in Cambodia; a small arms cache (types and origin were not indicated) was, however, subsequently

(Continued)

9 Dec 65

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page F-8

TOP SECTET PRINE

discovered along the shore in the vicinity of the ship's rendezvous with the sampans.

On 3 and 4 December, Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) located three Viet Cong transmitter sites in Cambodia, one which was identified as being the Kontum Battle Front Headquarters (Viet Cong/PAVN).


A message intercepted on 6 December indicates that a Viet Cong unit temporarily camped on Cambodian territory on 4 December. Cambodian forces were reportedly pursuing the Viet Cong unit on the 5th.

With the exception of the pilot's report of the ship and sampan rendezvous and the location of transmitter sites, the foregoing allegations have not been confirmed. Sihanoukville is a periodic port of call for Chinese Communist, Soviet, and Free World vessels. The amounts of military supplies coming through this port are unknown; military aid from China, the USSR, and France, which is intended for delivery to the FARK, however, arrives here. The final disposition and destination of this materiel is unknown, and some may get into the hands of the Viet Cong. Reports of the Phnom Penh road deterioration were received in early September. primary reasons for the road's condition are the lack of maintenance and damage caused during the recent rainy season. The normally heavy truck traffic from Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh is also a contributing factor. With respect to alleged medical or other Viet Cong installations, the relative sparseness of the population in northeastern Cambodia, the underdeveloped nature of the border area west of South Vietnam's Pleiku Province, and the region's remoteness from the focus of diplomatic activity in Phnom Penh would make possible the construction of clandestine Viet Cong facilities on the Cambodian side of the boundary with only a slight chance of detection.

While there is convincing evidence of long-standing Cambodian support for the Viet Cong, there are also reports which reflect examples of Cambodia's efforts to curtail Viet Cong activities on its territory. A recent review of intercepted Cambodian military messages revealed that on eight occasions since September, the

Cambodians have caused Viet Cong border crossers to return to South Vietnam. In addition, Cambodian authorities have consistently attempted to avoid the appearance of overt collusion with the Vietnamese Communists. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

DIA Intelligence Summary



Communist Trucking in Lao Panhandle


Communist truck movements in the Lao Panhandle have begun at least 30 to 45 days earlier this year than in previous dry seasons, but no large-scale use of the improved and still expanding trail network is yet apparent.

Roadwatcher reports indicate that truck traffic on Route 23 past a point near the junction of Route 121 last month averaged nine vehicles per day south and three north. At a point about 23 miles farther to the southeast on Route 23, the November average was 11 trucks south and seven north. The average during the first six days in December was 26 per day south and nine north past the northern point; the dearth of reporting from the southern point precludes any meaningful assessment of what happened there. December figures seem to have jumped from the November average, but it is too early to determine with any certainty whether there is an upward spiral of truck traffic on Route 23. On Route 92, a very low level of truck movements (one or two trucks per day) has been reported by roadwatchers at a point about 12 miles north of the route's southern terminus. porting from this point has, however, been irregular. Friendly guerrillas, who also watch the southern portion of Route 92, indicate that there were some truck movements in the early parts of October, November, and December.

Meanwhile, the Communists continue to improve and extend the infiltration network southeastward through the Panhandle. Aerial photographs of 16 November show that Route 911, an alternate to Route 23, and its extension along Route 91 are probably completed and being used. The Route 92 network is apparently also being lengthened through the southeastern tip of Laos — south of Route 165 and south and east of Attopeu — toward the triborder area. Analysis of aerial photographs shows that two trails running south from Route 165 to Route 16 have been improved. The extension of Route 96 is believed

COMPRESSIAL

ROUTE 23 IMPROVEMENTS NORTH OF ROUTE 911 JUNCTION 17-27N 105-43E



DIA-ISIC 9 DEC 65


capable of accommodating light vehicles. The easternmost trail has a number of branches that cross the
border and extend toward Route 14 in South Vietnam;
these include Routes 168 and 169. Route 14 is only
a few miles from and is generally parallel to the
border in this sector. Most of the heavy traffic
on the eastern trail and its branches is apparently
made up of cart and personnel on foot, but improvements to both the trails are believed to be still in
progress.

Photographs of the area east of Attopeu show Route 16 connecting with Route 14 in the South Viet-namese highlands. The portion of this road near Attopeu is believed to have been used by trucks for several years and was, until early 1962, included in an AID project to establish a major road from the Mekong River at Pakse to the South Vietnamese coast at Qui Nhon.

Movement down the Route 92 network is now possible farther south because of newly developed overland access links. The Se Kong River traffic can now be shunted around Attopeu to continue east along Route 16 or, using Routes 166E and 166, southward to supply points in Cambodia for eventual delivery to South Vietnam.

Substantial trucking has been reported on certain days in November and December. Yesterday's sighting of 12 1,000-gallon fuel trucks headed south on Route 23 indicates that refueling points are being established and that an increase in the use of the road network is imminent. While the apparent average level of traffic seems lower than might have been expected because of the feverish effort by the Communists to improve trails during adverse weather and despite air strikes, it is significant that truck movements began earlier this year than they did last year. The greatly increased road capacity could indicate that North Vietnamese planning has included: (1) Support for increased infiltration of troops and supplies through the Panhandle; (2) the development of a sufficient excess capability to move required supplies in spite of anticipated increased efforts at interdiction; and (3) selection of safer and more direct routing to bases of operation.


ROAD CAMOUFLAGE TECHNIQUE ROUTE 917



DIA-ISIC 9 DEC 65

SECRET

Expansion of the infiltration network southward would provide Hanoi greater flexibility in supporting Communist forces in South Vietnam's central highlands. Besides their efforts to expand their logistic "pipeline" out of the Panhandle, reports in recent weeks have also indicated that the Communists are still seeking additional infiltration routes into the Panhandle from North Vietnam. Sampan traffic on tributaries leading to routes across the border has risen sharply, and this leads to the belief that additional trails which cross the border below Mu Gia Pass may soon appear as part of the expanding Communist road network in the Panhandle. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)




Jet Light Bombers May Be in West China

An undetermined number of Chinese Communist IL-28/BEAGLE jet light bombers may have recently flown to Hotien Airfield, near the Kashmiri border. If so, this would be the most western deployment of such aircraft ever noted.

An IL-18/COOT that normally carries VIPs flew from Peiping to Hotien on 30 November and returned the next day. One flight of BEAGLES assigned to the 10th Division left Tatung on 27 November for West China accompanied by two IL-14/CRATE transports; the latter landed at Hotien on 3 and 7 December, respectively. A second group of BEAGLES departed Tatung on 4 December and flew at least as far as Wukung, according to a third-party intercept.

A 9,500-foot concrete runway was completed at Hotien last spring. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



Indonesian Army Further Defies Sukarno

Indonesian Army leaders are ignoring President Sukarno's plea of 6 December that they let him solve the country's political problems.

Shortly after Sukarno addressed the People's Provisional Consultative Assembly (MPCA), Brig Gen Umar Wirahadikusuma banned the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its Central Committee in the greater Djakarta area; this was Umar's parting directive as he left his post as Djakarta Military Commander to take over the army's Strategic Command. An army newspaper has hinted that this order in effect serves as a nationwide ban on the PKI since it cannot exist without a central headquarters.

The military have now proscribed the PKI or declared it "voluntarily dissolved" in the Riau Islands, Central Borneo, West Java, the Moluccas Islands, and South Celebes. Defense Chief Gen Nasution, Army Commander Maj Gen Suharto, and Navy Commander Adm Martadinata have all declared directly or indirectly that the armed forces are determined to press their anti-Communist campaign. Some newspapers are twisting Sukarno's speech to the MPCA in such a manner as to indicate that he supports rather than condemns the repression of the Communists.


pkI Second Deputy Chairman Njoto was arrested on 5 December; he is reportedly still alive but resisting interrogation. Sukarno is apparently more concerned about this development than the death of Chairman Aidit and has tried without success to obtain Njoto's release. The crypto-Communist Minister of Electricity and the editor of the banned PARTINDO party newspaper are also said to have been picked up.

Some reports have it that Sukarno may go to Vienna and Tokyo. Such a trip could be his "solution without a solution," but he may also need medical attention again. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Next three pgs are non responsive

DIA Intelligence Summary

(b)(3):50 USC 403-



COPYRENCE TO MESSAGE

Indonesian Communists May Be Receiving Logistic Support

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) may be using North Celebes and the Moluccas Islands as delivery points for arms shipments from abroad.

A recent Indonesian intelligence message said that prisoners claimed an unidentified submarine was to have delivered weapons to PKI front groups in certain islands in the Molucca Sea late last month. A submarine chaser was ordered to North Celebes on 27 November to intercept it. COMINT has also indicated an increase in Indonesian coastal patrolling in response to reports that Communists would receive arms and ammunition by sea from Communist China.

There have been no reports of submarines in the Celebes-Moluccas region, and no Chinese Communist submarine has ever been noted out of Chinese territorial waters. The Indonesian Navy would, however, be hard pressed to interdict deliveries of arms by sea if they were landed in remote areas. (SECRET SAVIN)

TOP SECRET -

ATTENTION:

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 8200:10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET